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Abstract
Although the business elites in western societies have a very privileged social background in 
common, there are substantial differences in the reproduction mechanisms and social trajectories 
leading to a position within this elite group. These differences are explored by comparing the 
career paths of the top 100 CEOs in Britain, France, Germany and Denmark. In France and Britain, 
this reproduction is mediated through degrees from elite universities. In Germany, the principle 
of admission is the incorporated cultural capital acquired through an exclusive bourgeois origin 
combined with any university degree. Elite universities also hold little importance for Danish top 
CEOs, partly due to the institutions’ historic decline; instead, reproduction is mediated through 
time spent in the economic field, placing the case of the Danish CEOs between that of their 
British and German counterparts. Specific trajectories of Danish executives, in particular sales 
people, are identified using Multiple Correspondence Analysis and cluster analysis.
Keywords
Bourdieu, CEO, commercial capital, correspondence analysis, economic elite, field of power, 
organizational capital, symbolic capital
Corresponding author:
Christoph Houman Ellersgaard, Department of Sociology, University of Copenhagen, Østre Farimagsgade 5, 
Building 16.2.42, 1014 Copenhagen K, Denmark. 
Email: che@soc.ku.dk
454349 SOC0010.1177/0038038512454349SociologyEllersgaard et al.
2012
Article
 at Aalborg University Library on December 10, 2012soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
2 Sociology 0(0)
Business Elite Reproduction
We must understand the objective structure of opportunities as well as the personal traits 
which allow and encourage given men to exploit these objective opportunities which 
economic history provides them. Charles Wright Mills (1956: 97)
The career trajectory of CEOs in large corporations shows which forms of resources 
these men – for they are usually men – use to qualify for, and legitimize holding, a posi-
tion of power and also allows us to view the relative strength of central societal institu-
tions, such as the family, the educational field and the market that transmits resources, 
and the nature of the respective national economies. As Aron (1950: 141) argues, one of 
the most characteristic features of any society is how the elite is structured and repro-
duced. Through a comparative study of the leading 100 senior executives in large, indus-
trial countries, primarily France, the UK, and a Scandinavian welfare state, Denmark, we 
explore the importance of families, educational system and economic organizations as 
institutions of elite reproduction.
While the relative importance of these institutions may differ in magnitude, the over-
all social origin of the top managerial elite is very similar, as shown in Table 1. At least 
four-fifths of senior executives originate from the top fifth of their respective society. 
The pathways are relatively heterogeneous, with diverse prevalences of exclusive sec-
ondary education, elite university diplomas and elite circulation. Following Hartmann 
(2007: 61–80) three models can be identified: 1) a French and Japanese model with high 
importance of elite universities – or grandes écoles – exclusive secondary education and 
high elite circulation; 2) a British and American model with high importance of elite 
universities and secondary education, but little elite circulation with low intersectoral 
mobility; and 3) a German model with little importance of elite universities and little 
elite circulation, with reproduction mediated through a ‘class-specific habitus’ – the 
incorporated cultural capital attained through upbringing in the bourgeois family 
(Hartmann, 2000: 243, see also Bourdieu, 1984: 66) – enabling individual mastery of the 
behavioural codes of the boardrooms. When looking at business elite reproduction, the 
question is to what degree the incorporated cultural capital of the business elite offspring 
can successfully be turned into institutionalized cultural capital in the form of diplomas 
from elite universities, enabling a ‘school-mediated mode of reproduction’ (cf. Bourdieu, 
1986: 244, 1996: 285–90), or, alternatively, are reproduction strategies based in forms of 
capital acquired outside educational institutions? The mode of reproduction of a 
Scandinavian business elite, however, remains largely unresolved vis-a-vis Hartmann’s 
terminology.
The phenomenon left to be explained is the surprisingly stable pattern of reproduction 
of the managerial elites. This pattern is part of a general image of an extremely homoge-
nous business elite with regard to age, sex and ethnicity (Bauer and Bertin-Mourot, 1999: 
16). Even though the reproduction rate of the business elite has decreased historically, the 
social background of this group has remained very exclusive over the last 250 years in the 
major industrialized nations (Kaelble, 1980: 415–16). Adding to this, Andrle (2001) sug-
gests that post-communist economic elites have a strong family linkage to the pre-
communist bourgeoisie, emphasizing the strength of this particular type of reproduction 
mechanism. The closer to the top of the business hierarchy, the more important having a 
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moneyed family background is (Hartmann, 2007: 92). In all the countries compared, the 
majority – approximately two-thirds – of the top CEOs are recruited from social groups 
within the top 20 per cent of society, as Maclean et al. (2006: 91) define the upper middle 
and upper class. Almost the same exclusive background can be identified among a less 
exclusive part of the economic elite in Norway (Gulbrandsen, 2005: 344). Along with 
cultural elites, economic elites have the most exclusive social background of all elites in 
the Scandinavian countries (Ruostetsaari, 2008: 164). The homogenous background of 
private corporate leaders is also seen in Germany (Hartmann, 2000), with estimates of 82 
of the top 100 senior executives originating from the dominant classes in 1995, of whom 
34 had fathers engaged as industrialists or bankers, while 11 originated from the middle 
and lower classes (Hartmann, 2000: 248), albeit the middle class includes only the CEOs 
with ‘Lower-middle class’ background in Table 1.
Drawing on the terminology of the field of power developed by Pierre Bourdieu 
(1996), the notion of forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1986) is used as a strategy to identify 
the resources at stake among the most powerful economic agents. By analysing holders 
of the top 100 executive positions, we restrict ourselves to a particular subspace – the 
business elite – within the economic pole of the field of power. These agents acquire 
the organizational capital needed to enter the upper echelons of corporate manage-
ment. The concept of the field of power is thus used as an epistemological tool, rather 
than as a grand theory that ties power tightly to economic and cultural capital (cf. 
Hjellbrekke and Korsnes, 2009: 44–5), to identify a multidimensional space of differ-
ent forms of capital within the business elites through geometrical data analysis. The 
structure of the different forms of capital needed to enter the business elite is explored 
using geometrical data analysis. Using the Euclidian distances generated within this 
space, four distinct pathways to top management in Denmark are explored through 
hierarchical cluster analysis.
Within this framework, convincing comparisons have been made between career trajec-
tories and the significance of educational institutions in large industrial societies (Bauer 
and Bertin-Mourot, 1999; Hartmann, 2007, 2010; Maclean et al., 2006); other studies have 
compared less exclusive elites (Useem and Karabel, 1986) or national elites alone (Bendix 
Table 1. Social origin of top 100 CEOs
Denmark France UK
Year 2007 1998 1998
Upper class 33% 43% 35%
Upper-middle class 35% 34% 29%
Lower-middle class 25% 19% 25%
Lower class 8% 4% 11%
N (of known cases) 78 98 91
Note: The data on France and the UK are based on Maclean et al. (2006: 91), who identify origin in the upper 
class exclusively by being ‘born into a family with substantial wealth and a large income based on inheritance 
or a parent occupying a leading position in society’ (Maclean et al., 2006: 266). Source: France and UK, 
Maclean et al. (2006: 91); Denmark, authors’ own research.
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and Howton, 1957; Flemmen, forthcoming). Although a study has described the business 
elite in Denmark (Christiansen and Togeby, 2007), the scope and methods received 
considerable criticism for their limitations (Andersen, 2005; Ellersgaard and Grau, 
2008; Sørensen, 2004), which led to inaccurate characterization of the Danish business 
elite within contemporary literature (Hartmann, 2010: 314; Ruostetsaari, 2008: 147ff).
While comparing the Danish case with larger, industrialized societies, particularly 
France, Britain and Germany, we address the following two research questions:
1) To what extent is the institutionalized cultural capital of Danish top CEOs tied to 
elite universities or elite schools?
2) Through which forms of capital do Danish top CEOs acquire and legitimize their 
position?
Understanding Business Elites through the Terminology 
of Fields
Following Savage and Williams’ (2008: 15) call to apply the terminology of Pierre 
Bourdieu as valuable guidance in the study of elite reproduction, we examine the sym-
bolic elements of the economic field (Lebaron, 2000: 124) used to legitimize the posi-
tions of executives. CEOs reproduce their position through symbolic capital, which is the 
legitimate form of capital giving their dominance an ‘innocence of natural phenomena’ 
(Bourdieu and De Saint-Martin, 1978: 26). The legitimating value of these symbols is 
determined in the struggles in the field of power (Bourdieu, 1996: 264–5). The symbolic 
capital used in the economic field is also determined by other fields, such as the aca-
demic field. Accordingly, our empirical findings of the social biography, educational 
pathway and career pattern of top CEOs are not merely a description of qualifications. 
These social facts can be analysed as position takings by accumulating legitimate forms 
of capital in relation to the state of – and struggles in – three embedded fields: 1) the field 
of the firm; 2) the economic field; and 3) the field of power. The relative autonomy of the 
economic field from other fields, and thereby its position in the field of power, is there-
fore indicated in the reproduction of the CEOs.
The strategies of firms[…] depend also on the structure of power positions constitutive of the 
internal governance of the firm or, more exactly, on the (socially constituted) dispositions of 
the directors [dirigeants] acting under the constraints of the field of power within the firm and 
the field of the firm as a whole. (Bourdieu, 2005: 205)
Hence, executives produce ‘the interest of the firm as their interest within the firm’ 
(Bourdieu, 2005: 207, italics in original). Bourdieu (2005) notes that firms as fields tend 
to have homologous or isomorphic structures (cf. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 148–50; 
Fligstein, 1996: 657) and thus that the same type of strategies may be successful. 
Therefore, the population of CEOs examined here can be seen as agents capable of hav-
ing success in the homologous fields of their respective firms.
We can understand the firm in which the top executives have succeeded as a field both 
of force and of struggle embedded within the economic field in general (Bourdieu, 2005: 
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69, 205–6). Due to the importance of economic capital, these fields are also related to the 
struggles within the field of power as a whole (Bourdieu, 1996: 264–72). A field of 
power is structured by particular compositions of capital, making the hierarchies of fields 
both multidimensional and relational (Hjellbrekke et al., 2007: 245–6). These structures 
are identified using Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) (Lebaron, 2009).
Bourdieu (2005: 194–5) identifies a number of central forms of capital in the eco-
nomic field. These include financial, cultural, technological, juridical and organizational, 
commercial, social and symbolic capital. ‘Capital’, Bourdieu (1986: 241) notes, ‘is accu-
mulated labor’ thus acquired over time depending on the structure of distribution of the 
different forms of capital. Having access to the capital needed to occupy a dominant 
position thus enables the agent to influence both the ‘games of society’ through which 
these forms of capital are accumulated and the conversion rates between different forms 
of capital, which is the central stake in the struggles within the field of power (Bourdieu, 
1996: 265).
The technological capital – ‘the portfolio of scientific resources (research potential) 
or technical resources (procedures, aptitudes, routines and unique and coherent know-
how, capable of reducing expenditure in labour or capital […])’ (Bourdieu, 2005: 194) – 
can be seen as an applied or field-specific component of cultural capital, while not 
necessarily requiring the same incorporated features as the mastery of a more general-
ized cultural capital. Therefore, we interpret university diplomas in economy or science, 
and particularly doctorates, as indicators of cultural-technical capital identifying experts 
rather than intellectuals. In our MCA, we limit our focus on the reproduction mechanism 
to organizational, cultural-technical, commercial and what can analytically be labelled as 
inherited capital. Available through ‘the Family Mode of Reproduction’ (Bourdieu, 1996: 
278ff), inherited capital can consist of 1) financial capital, such as the heritage of the 
financial resources tied to ownership; 2) cultural capital in the incorporated form allow-
ing the grace of the native within the social games of the dominant classes (cf. Bourdieu, 
1984: 339); 3) social capital providing access to the network of the established family; 
and through this 4) symbolic capital tied to the family name and its ‘social investment 
strategies’ (Bourdieu, 1996: 273). Inherited capital thus enables the agents to understand 
the doxa (Bourdieu, 1996: 35, 272) of the firm as a field, and the economic field in gen-
eral and gain mastery of the class-specific habitus (Hartmann, 2000), or what Mills 
(1956: 140) terms the ‘sound character’:
Those who have started from high have from their beginnings been formed by sound men and 
trained for soundness. They do not have to think of having to appear as sound men. They just 
are sound men; indeed, they embody the standards of soundness. (Mills, 1956: 142)
Data
The Danish data were collected using the prosopographical method (Broady, 2002), 
while using a wide array of sources to access biographical and corporate information. 
Data were systematically collected from the Danish equivalent of Who’s Who? (Kraks 
Blå Bog), Greens Erhvervsinformation (a private business information database), jour-
nalistic portrait articles, article search engines, bibliographic databases, financial reports 
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and public registers. The method used to identify forms of capital and relations is Specific 
Multiple Correspondence Analysis, with support from a descriptive analysis of the vari-
ous business elites.
CEOs from 82 corporations were selected according to their position as CEO in 
December 2007. We included 18 executives on other criteria, taking into account the 
magnitude of the corporations and issues regarding ownership and control, leaving us 
with a final population of 100 CEOs. These CEOs thus compose a business elite holding 
positions of command (Scott, 2003: 156–7). Inside this exclusive group of top corpora-
tions, there is a considerable difference in size. The turnover of the shipping giant A.P. 
Møller-Mærsk is 50 times higher than that of the company with the lowest turnover 
(EAC). The corporation with the most employees (ISS), with half a million employed, 
has more than a thousand times the number of employees than the state-controlled gam-
bling monopoly (Danske Spil). Because of these major size differences between top 
Danish corporations, more than one senior executive from the largest companies have 
been included. Moreover, six owner-managers were included – all were both former 
CEOs and current chairmen within the corporation – as they could be seen as the de facto 
leaders of the firm, both internally and externally.
The 82 corporations with formal ownership and management located in Denmark 
were selected through either financial capital, measured as having a turnover of over five 
billion DKK (€650 million), or organizational capital, defined as having a least 5000 
employees; 34 corporations were included on both criteria, 45 on financial capital and 
three on organizational capital alone. To avoid including investors, rather than execu-
tives, a minimum of 500 employees was also required, excluding 12 firms. Companies 
acting only as subsidiaries were also excluded.
The Comparative Methodology
The historical differences between the nation-state-based business elites under compari-
son are considerable (cf. Scott, 1997: 16; Windolf, 1998: 321–2). The most significant is 
the difference in the size of the economy and, consequently, also the number of world-
scale corporations. Likewise, the ownership structure varies, for example, with more 
dispersed shareholding in the UK and more family and state control in France (Maclean 
et al., 2006: 69) and Denmark. Following Hartmann (2010), a small number of Danish 
CEOs could be compared with the top 100 from large, industrialized countries. However, 
this would make it impossible to study elites of the same relational importance, reputa-
tion and size within the nation-states.
Apart from being cases of the three models of business elite reproduction, the reason 
we restrict our direct comparisons to certain studies of French, British (Maclean et al., 
2006) and German business elites (Hartmann, 2000, 2007, 2010) is because these studies 
define the business elites with the same level of exclusiveness as our data: the top 100 
senior executives, or the top decile of the dominant segment of the business elite as iden-
tified by Useem and McCormack (1981). Here, we present the most important discrepan-
cies. The Danish data include executives only, whereas Maclean et al. (2006) also include 
non-executives with many top-board memberships. Compared with our selection criteria 
of either financial or organizational capital, Hartmann (2000) used turnover with the 
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predefined relation 5:3:2 of corporations from industry, commerce and finance. The 
solution used for Denmark gives a relative strength of 39:32:17 from industry, commerce 
and finance (the 12 executives from conglomerates excluded). This should be attributed 
to the distinctive trading culture that has shaped economic life in Denmark (Fellman, 
2008), rather than to bias towards inclusion of commercial corporations in our analysis.
The Disappearance of the Elite School
Capital acquired through exclusive educational institutions has been given a pivotal role 
in studies of elite recruitment, with the importance of diplomas increasing with the size 
of the corporation (Bourdieu et al., 1973: 66–70). In this sense, elite universities are 
defined not so much by their ranking as by their ability to secure 1) a substantial number 
of alumni placed in the most powerful positions in society (Hartmann, 2000); and 2) an 
exclusive social selection, often probing the elite socialization through personal inter-
views (Karabel, 2005), thus enhancing elite consciousness. Consequently, this makes the 
sole selection criterion of Danish universities – grade-point average – a less efficient 
exclusion strategy because of the inability to examine, and thus legitimize, more per-
sonal traits gained through inherited capital (cf. Bourdieu, 1996: 295ff).
As Table 2 shows, the educational profile of Danish CEOs is similar to that of their 
British counterparts. A university diploma is certainly important to succeed in the upper 
echelons of management but is not a prerequisite in the same way as in Germany or 
France. Rarely do Danish CEOs have educations that are primarily connected with cul-
tural capital, such as the arts, humanities and social sciences. Instead, it is diplomas in 
applicable business knowledge or technical competences that are required. Hartmann 
(2000: 252) describes the difference between German universities focusing on techno-
logical capital – ‘the transfer of subject knowledge’ – and French elite institutions repro-
ducing and converting cultural capital: ‘abilities such as intellectual brilliance, rapid 
comprehension, responsibility, leadership drive, and a pronounced elite consciousness’.
No university programme or institution in Denmark can be seen as an elite university 
according to the first definition: in itself being so prestigious that a promising career 
leading to a highly powerful position is guaranteed. Most top CEOs (14) attended gen-
eral business education at the Copenhagen Business School (CBS), the University of 
Copenhagen or the Technical University of Denmark (DTU); each institution has 12 
alumni in top senior executive positions. Considering there are relatively few institutions 
offering university diplomas, the number of CEOs from each institution is low. 
Additionally, none of these institutions is important for the recruitment of other elite 
groups in Denmark.
While research clearly demonstrates that selection into tertiary education in Denmark 
is tied to parental social position and cultural reproduction (Munk and Thomsen, 2011; 
Thomsen, 2012), and the engineers and economists are generally recruited within the 
economic upper class, there is no indication in our Danish data of a strong linkage 
between parental background and the top CEOs’ elite education, as seen, for example, in 
the UK (Maclean et al., 2006: 119). Furthermore, no more than five of the top 100 CEOs 
qualified from among the top 25 programmes, measured by grade-point average mini-
mum of enrolled students, in either 1979 (the median graduation year of the CEOs) or in 
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2007. Thus the institutionally validated personality gained through exclusive social 
selection of the student – as used in the second definition of elite universities – is in no 
way a common feature of the programmes followed by the Danish CEOs. However, 
through examinations, some programmes may contribute to a selection process and thus 
gain more exclusivity before individuals take up executive positions.
Despite Germany having no elite universities, the institutionalized cultural capital of 
a university or doctoral degree is important: almost 90 per cent of CEOs have a higher 
degree and almost half have a PhD (Hartmann, 2010: 303–4). In Germany, doctorates 
may also be gained much later in the career trajectory (Bauer and Bertin-Mourot, 1999: 
26), tying holders of this title more to their organizational capital within the firm than to 
their inherited cultural capital. Nonetheless, the number of doctorates emphasizes the 
importance of scholarly capital compared with Denmark’s less than two-thirds with mas-
ter degrees and less than one in 10 with doctorates, as shown in Table 2. Thus, in 
Denmark, few exclusive university programmes, or academic merits in general, act as 
gatekeeper in legitimizing a potential elite member’s social qualifications.
Adding to this result, we have not been able to identify Danish secondary equivalents of 
the British public schools, the American boarding schools or the prestigious French Lycée 
[the khâgne] so important for both recruitment and networks of future elite individuals 
Table 2. Education profiles of top 100 CEOs
Germany France UK Denmark
Year 1995 1998 1998 2007
Education type
Arts, humanities or 
social sciences
27 2 12 7
Business, economics or 
administration
33 42 26 43
Science, engineering or 
medicine
22 44 27 25
Professional 6 4 29 23
School only 0 7 5 0
Not known 9 1 1 2
Highest qualification
Doctorate 46 10 6 8
Higher degree 36 80 23 54
First degree – 2 45 13
Professional qualification 
only
6 0 20 23
School – 7 5 0
Not known 9 1 1 2
N 97 100 100 100
Note: Sources: Germany, Hartmann (2000: 248); France and UK, Maclean et al. (2006: 117); Denmark, authors’ 
own research.
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(Bourdieu, 1996: 84; Maclean et al., 2006: 96ff; Mills, 1956: 67). The most well-known 
Danish boarding school, Herlufsholm, has only one former student as a top CEO; the two 
most prestigious secondary schools situated in the most upscale Copenhagen suburbs have 
two former top CEOs as alumni. No evidence suggests that social or cultural capital gath-
ered through the attendance at specific institutions of secondary education plays an impor-
tant role in the qualification or selection process of Danish top CEOs. These findings 
appear to be general for the Scandinavian countries; Mastekaasa (2004: 223) describes the 
absence of elite institutions in Norway on both the secondary and the tertiary level.
Interestingly, the lack of an elite university or programme is not because none has 
been established. In the 1950s, DTU was one of two institutions with admission criteria 
other than a secondary diploma. The DTU had an explicit focus on developing tomor-
row’s leaders (Reinholdt Hansen, 2000). In 1999 almost one-third of the top 250 Danish 
CEOs were engineers (Christiansen et al., 2001: 153), whereas only 17 engineers are 
included in our population of 2007, eight years later. Of these, 10 were born before 1950 
compared to only 27 of the CEOs in total, adding to the image of a declining engineering 
profession. While similar tendencies are found in Norway (Gulbrandsen et al., 2002: 59), 
the strength of the French engineers leads us to believe that the diminishing numbers of 
engineers may be due to the lack of exclusiveness. The decline of DTU’s prestige may 
have been due to its relocation in 1974 from the centre of Copenhagen to the suburbs, 
Kgs. Lyngby, and a subsequent restructuring, resulting in a substantial increase in enrol-
ment. Accordingly, the alumni lost both the symbolic benefits and the espirit du corps 
that a potential French executive gains from the numerus clausus at, for example, the 
École Nationale d’Administration with an annual intake of around 175 students from 
more than 2000 applicants.
The structural homology between the field of elite universities and the field of eco-
nomic power found by Bourdieu (1996) in France thus plays a subordinate role in the 
reproduction of the business elite in Denmark. As our correspondence analysis shows, 
we can therefore interpret the university diplomas of Danish top CEOs as principally 
being indicators of technical capital, as in Germany. However, as in Britain, this techni-
cal capital is not a prerequisite for a successful managerial career. In this sense, Denmark 
is placed between the German and the British positions, with elite universities being of 
little importance, as in Germany, but, as in Britain, academic qualifications in general 
being of less importance.
Reproduction through the Economic Field
Without the selection mechanism of elite universities, how are the cohesion, homogene-
ity and exclusive social background of CEOs possible? As Table 3 shows, it is necessary 
to have a career in the economic field. The degree of elite circulation in Denmark resem-
bles the low circulation found in Britain and Germany (Hartmann, 2010: 304) without 
the French tradition of pantouflage from higher civil service to a managerial career 
(Bourdieu, 1996: 329). However, loyalty towards one firm, an important component of 
organizational capital, seems more important in the larger industrial societies. More than 
half the German CEOs have spent their entire career within one corporation (Hartmann, 
2010), whereas this holds true for a quarter of the Danish top CEOs.
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Another important finding shown in Table 3 is that it seems much easier to change 
path from enterprise to corporate careers in Denmark than in both France and the UK. 
This suggests that capital and merits gained from the economic field in general, rather 
than purely the space of top corporations, qualify potential top CEOs. Likewise, Danish 
top CEOs have had, on average, almost one more corporation as an employer than have 
their French and British counterparts.
An important characteristic of Danish top CEOs in a comparative perspective is 
the importance of their corporate career and thus their organizational capital. The 
relatively high number of 16 CEOs with no educational diplomas, apart from being 
trainees in large corporations, points to the importance of some corporations, particu-
larly A.P. Møller-Mærsk, as being academies (cf. Cappelli and Hamori, 2005: 25) 
within a corporation-based mode of reproduction. This organizational capital is not a 
prerequisite, as the trajectories of several Danish top senior executives point to more 
irregular careers based in enterprises in the economic field, but outside the hierarchies 
of large corporations.
Identifying Relations between Forms of Capital: Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis
Correspondence analysis, Bourdieu (2005: 102, italics in original) notes, can be used ‘to 
bring to light the structure of positions or – and this amounts to the same thing – the 
structure of distribution of specific interest and powers that determines and explains the 
strategies of the agent’. Through this method, we visualise the opposite positions 
Table 3. Career profile and characteristics of top 100 CEOs
France UK Denmark
Year 1998 1998 2007
Corporate 41 84 57
Enterprise to corporate 9 2 30
Public administration or organizations to 
corporate
49 3 7
Law to corporate 0 6 1
Media, politics, academia or sports to corporate 1 5 2
Not known 0 0 3
N 100 100 100
Age at first appointment as top CEO 40.5 44.1 44.4
(Standard deviation) (6.0) (5.8) (7.3)
Number of companies to first top 100 
directorships
2.2 2.1 2.9
(Standard deviation) (1.2) (1.2) (1.8)
Note: Source: Career profile, age as top CEO and number of companies in France and UK (Maclean et al., 
2006: 127, 117, 139), Denmark, authors’ own research.
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generative of practice by graphically identifying the distribution of ‘objective positions’ 
within the business elite.
A Specific Multiple Correspondence Analysis, which allows us to ignore missing or 
redundant categories when determining the Euclidian distance between the individuals 
by which the principal axes are determined (Le Roux and Rouanet, 2004, 2010), was 
conducted on indicators of organizational, technical-cultural and inherited capital 
(Table 4). Note that these indicators cover the career trajectory only until the first 
appointment as a CEO at one of the 82 selected corporations. It is difficult to separate 
the institutionalized cultural capital tied to academic diplomas from the more work-
related and applicable technical capital when no valid indicators of either social or 
economic capital before appointment are available.
We identified a multidimensional Euclidian space consisting of three interpretable 
axes accounting for 57 per cent of the total adjusted inertia (Le Roux and Rouanet, 2004: 
209). The interpretation of the axes is inferred by the modalities with a contribution value 
above average (Jambu, 1991: 286).1 Figures 1 and 2 map the geometrical representation 
of the axes’ principal components. When interpreting these, distances between modali-
ties above 0.5 are considered ‘notable’, while distances above 1.0 are deemed to be 
‘large’ (Le Roux and Rouanet, 2010: 71). As shown in Figure 1, the first axis, explaining 
Table 4. Contribution of active variables
Heading Variable Modalities Dim.1 (25%) Dim.2 (18%) Dim.3 (14%)
Career Career start 2 7.9 4.8 0.8
 Years from education 
to executive
4 12.3 3.7 5.6
 Years in corporation 
until CEO
5 17.8 6.2 4.1
 Age as CEO 4 8.0 0.3 10.8
 Career changes 3 8.4 8.6 4.1
 MBA 3 4.3 1.6 2.6
 Business diploma 2 3.5 0.0 0.0
 Abroad 3 1.1 2.0 8.2
Total 26 63.3 27.2 36.2
Education PhD 2 0.8 7.5 1.6
 Education 9 17.1 16.9 8.9
 Author 2 1.9 12.1 2.4
 Career foundation 5 5.6 12.1 5.6
Total 18 25.4 48.6 18.5
Family Place of birth 5 5.0 13 10.3
 Social background 7 5.1 9.0 20.4
 In-laws in Who’s Who 2 0.7 0.5 2.0
 Family in Who’s Who 2 0.3 1.6 12.5
Total 16 11.1 24.1 45.2
All headings 60 100 100 100
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25 per cent of the total inertia, captures a contrast between agents holding large amounts 
of organizational capital (typically, trainees with long careers within the corporation and 
no company changes throughout their career) and those who succeeded through other 
forms of capital, usually with a much shorter career length.
The left side of the second axis, representing 18 per cent of the total inertia, shows 
CEOs with high amounts of technical or cultural capital before appointment; for exam-
ple, having authored a book, a doctoral degree and being born in a provincial town. The 
right side shows CEOs with large amounts of commercial capital. Characteristics of 
CEOs with commercial capital are a high number of career changes; rural upbringing; 
father being a farmer, craftsman or shopkeeper; career start in enterprises; and having a 
BSc and an MSc in Business from the Copenhagen Business School. All modalities of 
university education are placed on the left side of the second axis of technical and com-
mercial capital, while trainees and those with vocational training are placed with the 
business school graduates on the right side. Thus it seems that the distinctive features on 
Figure 1. Modalities with above average contributions to axis 1 and 2
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the Danish CEOs shown in Tables 2 and 3 are closely tied to a career path dependent on 
high amounts of commercial capital.
When interpreting the third axis, accounting for 14 per cent of the total inertia 
(Figure 2), a clear division in amount of inherited capital is seen, with top CEOs with 
parents (or parents-in-law) mentioned in the Danish equivalent of Who’s Who, parents 
who were executives or owners, and CEOs born in the Copenhagen area opposed prin-
cipally to CEOs with rural backgrounds. Those associated with high levels of inherited 
capital are seen as managerial potential from the start of their career and therefore 
achieve their first executive position shortly after finishing their education, reaching 
the top managerial elite before their 40th birthday. Those with a low level of inherited 
capital reach the top after they turn 50 years and, logically, have longer careers.
This three-dimensional structure, and particularly the important role of commercial 
capital in recruitment of Danish CEOs, could be a result of the larger commercial sector 
in this sample and in the Danish economy. This would hold if the sector of the corporation 
Figure 2. Modalities with above average contributions to axis 3
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as a supplementary variable were placed distinctively within the three-dimensional space. 
However, this is not the case. Industry, commerce, and finance are not distanced from 
each other by more than a 0.5 distance on the principal axis, allowing no valid interpreta-
tion of this deviation.
Cluster Analysis: The Pathway of Inheritors, the 
Organizational Personnel, Experts, and Salespeople
With the general structure of capital constructed, subgroups of distinct pathways can be 
constructed by cluster analysis to construct a typology (cf. Denord et al., 2011) of path-
ways to the top management in Denmark. Clusters of individuals have been identified by 
way of ascending hierarchical clustering of Euclidian distances within the three-dimen-
sional space of individual career trajectories constructed through the SMCA (Le Roux 
and Rouanet, 2004: 106–15) identifying the partition with four clusters as the best fit. 
The four clusters are shown in Figure 3 and can be described ideally as follows:
1 The inheritors (C1) are characterized by high levels of organizational and inher-
ited capital and relatively quick careers within a single corporation. Often sons of 
executives, born near the centre of the national field of power in Copenhagen, 
with a trainee background, a career start in management and foreign experience 
– typically less than seven years, but enough to acquire cosmopolitan capital (cf. 
Weenink, 2008), these men symbolize a sound character. A quarter (25) of the top 
CEOs are placed in this cluster. The inherited path is not uniquely characterized 
by the owners who inherited their position through financial control of the firm. 
Only seven (28%) of the CEOs in the inheritors’ cluster are owners, and these 
seven account for half the total number of owners (14) in the study. Thus the 
majority of the inheritors do not follow this path as a result of material inherit-
ance of ownership; instead, it is due to their ability to master the class-specific 
habitus.
2 The organizational personnel (C2) also have a high level of organizational capi-
tal but very little inherited capital. These men have worked their way to the top 
within one corporation and are, on average, seven years older than their peers 
before their appointment as top CEOs and have a significantly lower number of 
career changes. On average, their capital structure is slightly more tied to techni-
cal than commercial capital, both in general and in comparison with the inheri-
tors. The label ‘the organizational personnel’ applies to 27 top CEOs.
3 The experts (C3) have high levels of technical capital, quick careers, authorships 
and PhDs. These men have been able to benefit from their merits in scholarly 
fields. It is also among these agents that we find the few career patterns that 
involve positions in the state bureaucracy or organizations and an educational 
background in economics in common with top politicians and bureaucrats – the 
characteristics of pantouflage. With parents without a particularly prestigious 
background, and with partners in academic jobs, it appears that this relatively 
rare trajectory – followed by only 14 CEOs – is similar to the path trodden by the 
highly scholarly qualified German CEOs and the elitist French CEOs.
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4 The salespeople (C4) seem to have the most homogenous trajectory when 
looking at the concentration ellipses in Figure 3. It is also the most common of 
the four trajectories, followed by more than a third (34) of the top CEOs. 
Typically, these men have high levels of commercial capital, with a career start in 
enterprises, many career changes and a rural upbringing. Like the experts, these 
men have not spent many years in their current firm accumulating capital. 
However, they have spent their entire career in private businesses, usually with-
out prestigious diplomas to catapult them to a certain level of the organizational 
hierarchy. Instead, they started their career in sales or marketing and gradually 
worked their way up through different enterprises and corporations. CEOs quali-
fied by their commercial capital work in firms that are younger – the average age 
of their firms being 51 years – than the average of 82 years for all corporations 
included here. The firms managed by salespeople are also less profitable and less 
prestigious than the other firms, as seen by the lack of publicity, both in the num-
ber of press articles and books about the firm. These characteristics are correlated 
to other indicators of firm prestige such as members of other sub-elites on the 
board of directors and sheer economic size. In many ways these organizations 
offer a trajectory more compatible with the strategy of a newcomer to the field 
with dispositions from an upbringing in a self-employed milieu.
Discussion
Adding to Hartmann’s (2007) three models of reproduction, we place the Danish 
business elite as being tied to the German case of both low elite circulation and low 
importance of elite universities or public schools. The cultural-technical capital 
acquired through university diplomas in general and postgraduate studies in particu-
lar appears to be specific for the German and French case rather than the Danish 
case. Like the British case, capital acquired through the economic field in Denmark 
is more important, with the important distinction that not only organizational capital, 
but also commercial capital qualifies for a position in top management. On the basis 
of a Specific Multiple Correspondence Analysis, it is possible to identify four clus-
ters of career trajectories: the inheritors, the organizational personnel, the experts, 
and the salespeople.
Of these groups, only the 14 experts can be seen as legitimizing their power through 
capital acquired in the educational system. The lack of an institution of elite education 
thus implies a weaker position of cultural capital – and institutions that distribute it – 
within the business elite and perhaps within the Danish power elite as a whole. It is pos-
sible that the lack of elite schools can be attributed to the egalitarian ethos of the 
decommodifying, social-democratic Scandinavian welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 
1990). Nevertheless, it may also be a function of the relatively small size of the Danish 
elite, which is therefore unable to sustain an elite school.
These findings emphasize the need for the use of Pierre Bourdieu’s terminology of the 
social stratification of the elite in an economic and cultural fraction as a model of the 
logic behind ‘the organic solidarity of the genuine division of the labor of domination’ 
(Bourdieu, 1996: 263) rather than as a theory of the social ontology of elites in all 
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western nation-states. Thus the analysis follows Hjellbrekke et al. (2007) in showing 
how the forms of capital structuring the field of power vary across different nation-states 
depending on the particular strength of different institutions of reproduction. The inte-
gration of the corporate, political and military elite into a power elite in C. Wright Mills’ 
(1956) analysis should likewise be interpreted as a theory on the effects of elite cohesion 
and not as a description of the paramount elite fractions across historical and national 
boundaries.
However, the reproduction strategies of the business elites tied to nation-state institu-
tions are under considerable pressure because of the rise of transnational corporations 
and the ensuing integration of corporate elites into transnational communities, demon-
strated by Carroll (2010). Even though the vast majority of the included corporations 
have some – or even all – of their activities located outside Denmark, only five CEOs 
were not born in Denmark. Of these, all have been tied to the Danish economic field for 
many years. Two started their career in Danish corporations or in Denmark more than 20 
years prior to their current appointment. One married the heiress to the corporation he 
now heads. Two are Swedes and are thus familiar with the particular social games of the 
Scandinavian boardrooms. These findings follow the pattern found by Hartmann (2010: 
315–16) in Germany and France. Furthermore, fewer than half the Danish CEOs have 
worked abroad, and, of the 47 who have, 36 were stationed abroad by their Danish parent 
corporation. While 24 of the 26 MBA degrees of Danish CEOs were acquired from busi-
ness schools outside Denmark, which confirms that an international market for exclusive 
executive degrees taken during a corporate career has been established (see also Marceau, 
1989), only six of the Danish-born CEOs have their university diploma, or parts of it, 
from abroad. While networks of corporate power, and the culture of business elites (cf. 
Sklair, 2001: 255–94), have gone global, access to them is still tied to local dynamics 
within the reproduction strategies of national business elites.
The exclusive social background of Danish CEOs and the specific trajectories of 
recruitment question the picture of the open nature of Scandinavian elites, cited below 
using the analysis of the Danish Power Study. A very particular and strong form of char-
acter still has to be formed to be considered top managerial material.
The social exclusivity of elites increases according to the size of the respective country [while] 
there are also specific national traditions and balances of power […]. In the Scandinavian 
countries with their comparably egalitarian basic attitude and their relatively open educational 
system the social composition of elites is on average less exclusive than in countries with 
explicit institutions of elite education, a classical upper class, or a tradition as a great power. 
Hartmann (2010: 222)
The importance of this character can be seen by the fact that the reproduction of business 
elites is not tied solely to exclusive social background. Women also form a minority. In 
the Scandinavian countries, there are no more than 5 per cent of women in any of the 
business elites (Ruostetsaari, 2008: 163). Moreover, there are no more than two women 
amongst the 100 top managers in France, Britain (Maclean et al., 2006: 7) and Denmark. 
This suggests that explanations focusing on the more bodily acquired skills (such as 
mastery of the natural tone of voice, gesture and body language) that enable an individ-
ual to play the power games within the firms and the business elites (Bourdieu, 1996; 
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Hartmann, 2000; Mills, 1956; Zweigenhaft and Domhoff, 1998) can have great explana-
tory value for the stable reproduction of business elites.
The world economy was shaken by the financial crisis, and questions were raised 
about managerial legitimacy in the transnational corporations. When viewed from a 
national perspective, the qualifications and traits of the CEOs seem functional necessi-
ties of the managerial position. However, when compared across countries, the arbitrary 
nature of these requirements becomes apparent. If there were a universal requirement, it 
would be to have the established social background, which does not resonate well within 
a meritocratic ethos. A critical perspective on the historically established character of the 
CEO and its consequences for the quality and ethics of corporate governance is therefore 
required.
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